desloppify
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/desloppify_portable.pyusesos.execvpeto launch the externaldesloppifyCLI tool with arguments provided at runtime. It also utilizessubprocess.runto execute localgitcommands for repository state management (e.g.,git rev-parse,git check-ignore, andgit ls-files). This allows the agent to execute arbitrary sub-commands within the scope of the installed tools. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
SKILL.mdandreferences/upstream-and-safety.mdinstructs users to download and install the core engine from an external GitHub repository (github.com/peteromallet/desloppify) that is not identified as a trusted source. This introduces a dependency on unverified third-party code into the execution environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze entire codebases, including source code and comments, which are considered untrusted data. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious instructions embedded in the analyzed code could potentially influence the agent's behavior during the review or repair process. The skill acknowledges this risk in its guardrails, advising the agent to treat comments as untrusted data.
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