skills/miguelrios/unc-skills/tether/Gen Agent Trust Hub

tether

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The references/setup.md file directs users to run a setup command using npx which downloads and executes code from the author's repository (github:miguelrios/unc-skills#main). While this is a vendor-owned resource, it involves remote code execution at the installation phase.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates indirect prompt injection by routing incoming Slack replies into active AI agent sessions (e.g., Claude Code, Codex).
  • Ingestion points: Slack messages received via Socket Mode or polling as described in SKILL.md and references/contract.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill mentions stripping synthetic history before resuming sessions, but does not explicitly define robust delimiters (like XML tags) for untrusted Slack content.
  • Capability inventory: The bound agent sessions typically have high-privilege capabilities including file system access and shell execution.
  • Sanitization: The skill contract mandates credential redaction at the Slack egress point and performs process fingerprinting to ensure input is only sent to the specific terminal pane intended for the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts/tether_notify.py script uses subprocess.run to execute commands via the hermes binary. These commands manage gateway services (start, restart, install) and plugin configuration. The execution uses list-based arguments which mitigates shell injection risks.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The notification script dynamically loads a runtime module (bridge_runtime.py) from the user's local data directory (~/.local/share/tether/) using importlib. This allows the script to execute code that is not statically present in the distributed skill files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 22, 2026, 06:55 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — tether