tether
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
references/setup.mdfile directs users to run a setup command usingnpxwhich downloads and executes code from the author's repository (github:miguelrios/unc-skills#main). While this is a vendor-owned resource, it involves remote code execution at the installation phase. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates indirect prompt injection by routing incoming Slack replies into active AI agent sessions (e.g., Claude Code, Codex).
- Ingestion points: Slack messages received via Socket Mode or polling as described in
SKILL.mdandreferences/contract.md. - Boundary markers: The skill mentions stripping synthetic history before resuming sessions, but does not explicitly define robust delimiters (like XML tags) for untrusted Slack content.
- Capability inventory: The bound agent sessions typically have high-privilege capabilities including file system access and shell execution.
- Sanitization: The skill contract mandates credential redaction at the Slack egress point and performs process fingerprinting to ensure input is only sent to the specific terminal pane intended for the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/tether_notify.pyscript usessubprocess.runto execute commands via thehermesbinary. These commands manage gateway services (start, restart, install) and plugin configuration. The execution uses list-based arguments which mitigates shell injection risks. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The notification script dynamically loads a runtime module (
bridge_runtime.py) from the user's local data directory (~/.local/share/tether/) usingimportlib. This allows the script to execute code that is not statically present in the distributed skill files.
Audit Metadata