avatar-maker
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text strings via the
--style-modparameter, which are interpolated directly into the prompts used for image generation. This represents a potential vulnerability surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in the style data. - Ingestion points: The
--style-modcommand-line argument and input photo reference path/URL. - Boundary markers: The prompt construction uses natural language labels but lacks formal delimiters or "ignore previous instructions" safety markers around the interpolated user input.
- Capability inventory: The skill calls external image generation APIs (via internal runners) and performs file system operations to save generated images and manifests.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the
--style-modinput is documented in the skill instructions. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The entry point script
scripts/run.pyutilizesos.execvto perform process replacement. The script dynamically locates a local virtual environment (.runners-venv) and re-executes itself using the specific Python interpreter from that environment. While a standard utility pattern, it involves dynamic execution paths. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill configuration requires the
Bashtool to initiate the Python-based execution pipeline through thescripts/run.pyscript.
Audit Metadata