flyer-maker
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to use the
Bashtool to execute a command-line interface (flyer-maker), which delegates to local Python scripts. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The entry point script
scripts/run.pyimplements process replacement viaos.execv(). It dynamically calculates the path to a virtual environment Python interpreter (ROOT / ".runners-venv" / "bin" / "python3") and re-executes itself within that environment. This is a common pattern for local tool runners but involves runtime path computation for executable code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input through various CLI flags such as
--title,--date, and--location. This data is interpolated into prompt templates for external image generation models. - Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via command-line arguments
--title,--subtitle,--date,--time,--location, and--ctaas described inreferences/event-details.md. - Boundary markers: Prompt templates in
references/composition-zones.mduse double quotes as delimiters (e.g.,Headline: "<TITLE>"), which may not be sufficient to prevent instruction override if the user provides malicious content. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via the
Bashtool, write files to the local filesystem, and make network requests to multiple third-party image generation APIs (Ideogram, OpenAI, Google, BFL, ByteDance). - Sanitization: The skill documentation mentions length-based validation to prevent visual distortion, but there is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of control characters or instructions within the user-provided strings.
Audit Metadata