subtitle-burner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The entry point script
scripts/run.pyusesos.execvto re-execute itself within a local virtual environment. This is a standard pattern for ensuring the script runs with the intended Python interpreter and dependencies. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface where untrusted data from subtitle files is processed and incorporated into shell commands.
- Ingestion points: User-provided SRT, VTT, and TXT files parsed in the pipeline described in
SKILL.mdandreferences/subtitle-formats.md. - Boundary markers: None identified; individual text cues are processed as string literals for the video filter.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes
ffmpegandffprobeas subprocesses to render captions and detect video duration. - Sanitization: Partial; the documentation in
references/troubleshoot.mdacknowledges that escaping for special characters in theffmpegdrawtextfilter is incomplete, potentially leading to command malformation if malicious content is provided in a subtitle file. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation provides instructions for installing the
ffmpegdependency via system package managers likebrewandapt-get. It also includes an examplecurlcommand targeting the OpenAI API for transcription, which is provided for informational purposes.
Audit Metadata