ad-creative-engine

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The scripts/generate.py script contains an upload_local_paths function that automatically uploads local files to fal.ai's cloud storage if their paths are included in manifest fields ending in _url or _urls. While this is a functional requirement for processing image assets, it creates a mechanism where the agent could inadvertently or maliciously exfiltrate sensitive files (e.g., SSH keys or configuration files) if manipulated to include those paths in the generation manifest.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions (SKILL.md) direct the agent to execute local Python scripts (scripts/generate.py and scripts/gallery.py) to manage API interactions and generate a local HTML gallery. This involves running code within the user's local environment using a dedicated virtual environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied brand documentation files (brand/brand-dna.md, brand/brand-voice.md, brand/icp-cards.md) to guide the generation of ad copy. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads markdown files from the brand/ directory to contextualize its generations.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions command the agent to read all files but do not provide specific delimiters or instructions to disregard potential malicious directives embedded within those files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read and write files, perform network operations via the fal-client library, and execute local Python scripts.
  • Sanitization: Absent. Content from the brand files is directly used by the LLM to influence ad copy variations and image briefings.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 12, 2026, 04:26 AM