ad-creative-engine
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
scripts/generate.pyscript contains anupload_local_pathsfunction that automatically uploads local files to fal.ai's cloud storage if their paths are included in manifest fields ending in_urlor_urls. While this is a functional requirement for processing image assets, it creates a mechanism where the agent could inadvertently or maliciously exfiltrate sensitive files (e.g., SSH keys or configuration files) if manipulated to include those paths in the generation manifest. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions (
SKILL.md) direct the agent to execute local Python scripts (scripts/generate.pyandscripts/gallery.py) to manage API interactions and generate a local HTML gallery. This involves running code within the user's local environment using a dedicated virtual environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied brand documentation files (
brand/brand-dna.md,brand/brand-voice.md,brand/icp-cards.md) to guide the generation of ad copy. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. - Ingestion points: The agent reads markdown files from the
brand/directory to contextualize its generations. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions command the agent to read all files but do not provide specific delimiters or instructions to disregard potential malicious directives embedded within those files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read and write files, perform network operations via the
fal-clientlibrary, and execute local Python scripts. - Sanitization: Absent. Content from the brand files is directly used by the LLM to influence ad copy variations and image briefings.
Audit Metadata