managing-claude-code-meta
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The template provided in
standard/MAIN_AGENT_CLAUDE.mdcontains instructions that override the agent's default assistant persona, directing it to "Act as a peer, not an assistant" and to "Scrutinize the user's suggestions and claims." - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes untrusted project files during its migration and audit workflows.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads existing
CLAUDE.mdandREADME.mdfiles from the target project path inworkflows/migrate.mdandworkflows/audit.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack boundary markers or warnings to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the processed project files.
- Capability inventory: The agent can read files (
cat,ls), write files (installing theCLAUDE.mdtemplate), and execute shell commands (find,wc). - Sanitization: The skill does not perform any sanitization or filtering of the content read from external project files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses various shell commands, including
find,ls,cat, andwc, to inspect the filesystem and audit project structure. These commands are executed locally based on the provided project path.
Audit Metadata