railway-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides an installation method that fetches and executes a shell script from the official Railway installation endpoint and includes a command for updating the tool.
- Evidence: The instruction
bash <(curl -fsSL cli.new)inSKILL.mdand therailway upgradecommand both involve executing code downloaded from remote sources. - [PERSISTENCE]: The reference guide contains commands to append shell completions to configuration files like
.bashrcand.zshrc. - Evidence: Found in
reference.mdunder therailway completioncommand section:railway completion bash >> ~/.bashrc. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Commands such as
railway runandrailway shellallow for the execution of arbitrary local processes with injected secrets. - Evidence: These commands are intended to run migrations or scripts with production/staging credentials injected into the environment.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's ability to run commands based on project state creates a surface for executing instructions found in untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: Local project files, environment configurations, and command arguments supplied during runtime.
- Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or warnings are provided to the agent to distinguish between instructions and data.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution, file system access, and environment variable management.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the commands passed to the
railway runutility is described. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user or agent to download the CLI tool from various package registries.
- Evidence: Installation methods include
brew install railwayandnpm i -g @railway/cli.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata