meilisearch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses imperative language such as "CRITICAL" and "MUST" to instruct the agent to prioritize fetching external documentation over its internal training data. This is a common design pattern in documentation-focused skills to ensure technical accuracy.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to fetch content from
https://www.meilisearch.com/docs/llms.txt. This reference targets the official domain of Meilisearch, a well-known open-source technology service. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill incorporates external data into the agent's context by fetching a remote documentation file, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the source were compromised.
- Ingestion points: The skill triggers a
WebFetchcall inSKILL.mdto retrieve thellms.txtfile. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or boundary instructions are used to separate the external content from the agent's internal instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent is expected to use the fetched documentation to write code, configure search indices, and manage API keys as described in
SKILL.md. - Sanitization: The skill does not implement sanitization or validation for the content returned by the external URL.
Audit Metadata