api-client
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/api-request.shconstructs a shell command by interpolating variables such as$ENDPOINT,$DATA, and$JSON_PAYLOADdirectly into a command string. This string is then executed inside a Docker container usingdocker exec ... bash -c "$CURL_CMD". Because these inputs are not properly escaped or sanitized for shell execution, a malicious user or an attacker-controlled API could provide input (e.g., using single quotes to break out of the wrapping) to execute arbitrary commands within the MikoPBX container. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic execution by assembling a curl command at runtime based on the provided HTTP method and payload parameters, which is then passed to a shell for evaluation.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external MikoPBX API responses and displays the results to the agent without sanitization or the use of boundary markers. This creates a vulnerability where malicious data stored in the PBX (e.g., in call records or extension names) could contain hidden instructions that trick the agent into performing unintended actions.
- Ingestion points: API responses are captured and displayed by
scripts/api-request.shand various reference examples. - Boundary markers: None are present in the documentation or instructions to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the API output.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
docker exec,Bashtool, andReadtool, which could be abused if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: The skill only performs JSON pretty-printing via
python3 -m json.tool, which does not strip or escape potential prompt injection content.
Audit Metadata