pixel-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to automate UI rendering and Git operations. Specifically, it uses
git fetch,git show,git hash-object,git mktree, andgit commit-treeto create ephemeral commits. It also performs agit push --forceto specific reference namespaces (refs/pr-screenshots/andrefs/evidence/) to host images for pull request reviews. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from the repository to perform visual comparisons.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Step 2) reads ticket acceptance criteria and design specifications directly from project files and passes them to a secondary agent context. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the instructions for separating the spec text from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to file system reads, shell command execution (Git and headless Chromium), and network communication via
git pushto the remote repository. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or filtering for the external spec text before it is interpolated into the judge agent's context.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content from the remote Git repository (
origin) and generates URLs forraw.githubusercontent.comto embed screenshots in pull requests. These operations target well-known services and are consistent with the skill's primary purpose.
Audit Metadata