review-componentization
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute
git rev-parse --show-toplevelto programmatically identify the repository root directory. - Evidence: Found in Section 1, 'Assemble the judge's inputs'.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted artifacts (HTML, code files) through a sub-agent without explicit security boundaries.
- Ingestion points: Section 1 specifies gathering 'settled study HTML', 'inventory', and 'built code' files.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific 'ignore instructions' warnings for the sub-agent's prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Agenttool to spawn sub-tasks and supports modifying code via the 'Fix' directive. - Sanitization: No sanitization of ingested content is mentioned before it is passed to the sub-agent.
Audit Metadata