run-desktop
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
driver.mjsscript accepts an--evalargument which is executed within the Electron renderer process usingeval(). This provides a mechanism for arbitrary JavaScript execution inside the application context. The script also explicitly disables the Electron sandbox (ELECTRON_DISABLE_SANDBOX: '1'), which increases the potential impact of any code executed within the renderer.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill can extract and return information from the application UI via the--testidflag, the results of the--evalexpression, and thewindow.title()call. This allows sensitive data displayed in the app to be read into the agent's context.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script allows specifying an output path for screenshots via the--outflag. Because this path is resolved usingresolve(process.cwd(), ...), it could be used to overwrite files outside the intended directory if a specific path is provided.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it processes and returns data from the application's UI, which may contain untrusted content.\n - Ingestion points: UI text fetched via
--testid, the application title, and results from evaluated JavaScript expressions indriver.mjs.\n - Boundary markers: None present; the skill does not instruct the agent to distinguish between UI data and instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can run shell commands (building via
bun, executing vianode) and write files to the disk.\n - Sanitization: None; data read from the application is returned directly to the agent's output stream.
Audit Metadata