setup-graphify
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the installation of the Python package
graphifyyviauv tool installorpip install. This name is a potential typosquat of the legitimate and widely-usedgraphifypackage. The package is downloaded from a public registry and its source code is not verified within the skill. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill configures a git pre-commit hook (in
.git/hooks/pre-commitor.husky/pre-commit) that executesgraphify updateautomatically. This establishes a persistence mechanism where third-party code is executed every time a user performs a git commit in the repository. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an indirect prompt injection surface. The
graphifytool ingests the entire codebase to build a knowledge graph, which is then provided to the AI agent to influence its reasoning. - Ingestion points: The tool reads all files in the current directory (excluding those in
.graphifyignore) viagraphify update .in the pre-commit hook andgraphify extract .in the initial setup (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill does not provide any instructions or markers to help the agent distinguish between the graph data and its own system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to install packages, modify git configurations, write shell scripts to hook directories, and execute shell commands.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content extracted from the codebase before it is incorporated into the graph and presented to the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata