setup-pinnacle-remote-tool
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads a binary Python wheel file (
tuplatform_connect-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl) from the external domainconnect.aiscientist.tools. This domain is not a recognized trusted vendor or a standard package registry. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use
pip installto install software directly from a remote URL (https://connect.aiscientist.tools/...). Installing binary wheels from unverified sources allows for the execution of arbitrary code during the installation process and the inclusion of potentially malicious modules in the local environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of multiple high-risk shell commands, including manual virtual environment management, the installation of local requirements files, and the execution of dynamically generated Python scripts using heredocs (`python
- <<'PY'`).
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill handles external data that creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads provider artifacts from paths specified in the
PINNACLE_DATA_PATHenvironment variable and processes user-provided JSON arguments for the retrieval tool. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing logic described.
- Capability inventory: The environment allows package installation, local file system access, and the creation of network relays using the
tu servecommand. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for data retrieved from external artifacts or user arguments.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata