setup-pinnacle-remote-tool

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads a binary Python wheel file (tuplatform_connect-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl) from the external domain connect.aiscientist.tools. This domain is not a recognized trusted vendor or a standard package registry.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use pip install to install software directly from a remote URL (https://connect.aiscientist.tools/...). Installing binary wheels from unverified sources allows for the execution of arbitrary code during the installation process and the inclusion of potentially malicious modules in the local environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of multiple high-risk shell commands, including manual virtual environment management, the installation of local requirements files, and the execution of dynamically generated Python scripts using heredocs (`python
  • <<'PY'`).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill handles external data that creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads provider artifacts from paths specified in the PINNACLE_DATA_PATH environment variable and processes user-provided JSON arguments for the retrieval tool.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing logic described.
  • Capability inventory: The environment allows package installation, local file system access, and the creation of network relays using the tu serve command.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for data retrieved from external artifacts or user arguments.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 24, 2026, 08:20 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — setup-pinnacle-remote-tool