setup-uspto-downloader-remote-tool

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download and install a Python package directly from a URL targeting a non-standard domain.
  • Evidence: python -m pip install ... "tuplatform-connect @ https://connect.aiscientist.tools/downloads/tuplatform_connect-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl#sha256=3fad5eee5ecf7887a693d93ccd1aa112dc0955617a885d1fc3daded0030f9ae0" in SKILL.md.
  • Note: Although a SHA-256 hash is provided for integrity, the source domain is not a well-known service or a recognized trusted organization.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of various shell commands and scripts to initialize the environment and validate the setup.
  • Evidence: python scripts/remote_validation/setup_skill_preflight.py --implementation uspto-downloader and various tu remote CLI commands in SKILL.md.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions include heredoc patterns to dynamically generate and execute Python scripts for local verification.
  • Evidence: Multiple blocks using `python
  • <<'PY'to list tools and call the MCP server inSKILL.md`.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external patent data, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the retrieved content contains malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: USPTO HTTPS hosts (specified in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the prompt templates (absent).
  • Capability inventory: Network access to USPTO, local file system writes to caches/ and runs/, and local server hosting via fastmcp.
  • Sanitization: The skill advises the user to "Check... absence of paths, secrets, and traces" but does not describe automated sanitization or escaping mechanisms.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 11, 2026, 05:27 PM