tooluniverse-precision-oncology
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes data from multiple external sources not under the direct control of the author, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Tool outputs from PubMed, CIViC, ClinVar, and ClinicalTrials.gov are integrated into the agent's context during the interpretation and recommendation phases.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not employ explicit delimiters or system instructions for the agent to ignore or isolate potentially malicious instructions embedded in external content.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities for network operations across numerous APIs and the execution of a local Python script via subprocess.run.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of specific sanitization or validation of external tool outputs before they are processed into final narrative reports.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs automated downloads of research data from a well-known scientific institution.
- Evidence: The included script
scripts/gdsc_drug_response.pyutilizesurllib.request.urlretrieveto fetch Excel-formatted drug sensitivity datasets from the Wellcome Sanger Institute's domain (cog.sanger.ac.uk). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the invocation of a local helper script to process scientific data.
- Evidence: The
API_USAGE_PATTERNS.mdfile defines a pattern for executingscripts/gdsc_drug_response.pyusingsubprocess.runwith a list-based argument format, which mitigates common shell injection risks.
Audit Metadata