tooluniverse-proteomics-analysis
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to search for and execute canonical analysis scripts such as
analysis.R,run_*.py,find_*.R, and*.Rmdfound within the data folder 'as-is'. This behavior allows the execution of arbitrary code that may be present in a potentially untrusted dataset. - Evidence: SKILL.md contains 'Canonical analysis scripts (analysis.R, run_.py, find_.R, *.Rmd) → execute as-is and read the output.'
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the agent to 'write and run Python code via Bash' to perform statistical calculations and data processing. The
CODE_REFERENCE.mdprovides numerous templates for runtime code generation and execution involvingpandas,scipy, andnetworkx. - Evidence: SKILL.md states 'When analysis requires computation... write and run Python code via Bash. Don't describe what you would do — execute it and report actual results.'
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests content from external data sources including mass-spec outputs (CSV, TSV), pre-computed results, and executed notebooks. These ingestion points lack explicit boundary markers or sanitization, potentially allowing malicious instructions embedded in data files to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: reads
*_executed.ipynb,proteinGroups.txt,*_Report.tsv, and various result CSVs. - Boundary markers: Absent; no instructions are provided to the agent to ignore instructions embedded in the data files.
- Capability inventory: Full access to Bash/Python execution and network access to scientific databases.
- Sanitization: Not mentioned; the skill uses standard library functions to load data directly into analysis pipelines.
Audit Metadata