domainkit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests content from the local repository (manifests, READMEs, and code files) to generate or audit documentation, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: In
modes/init.md, the skill reads project manifests (package.json,pyproject.toml, etc.), README files, and entry points. Inmodes/audit.md, it reads all repository files changed since the last domain-model commit. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not explicitly require the use of delimiters or "ignore" warnings when interpolating the ingested content into the prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Write,Edit, and restrictedBashtools, which could be misused if an injection successfully influences the agent. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the ingested file content is mentioned in the instructions.
- Mitigation: The skill implements a mandatory consent-gate for every write operation as defined in
SKILL.md, ensuring the user reviews and approves all proposed changes before they are applied to the filesystem. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes restricted shell commands to perform repository audits.
- Evidence:
modes/audit.mdexecutesgit log -1 --format='%H %cs' -- CONTEXT.md CONTEXT-MAP.mdto find the last update andgit log --name-only --format= <sha>..HEADto identify changed files. - Context: These operations are limited to the
git logcommand as specified in theallowed-toolsconfiguration in theSKILL.mdfrontmatter, preventing arbitrary command execution.
Audit Metadata