paseokit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves pull request and issue titles from GitHub (via the
ghCLI) and branch names from Git to populate Paseo workspace titles. - Ingestion points: Data enters the context through
gh issue view --json titleandgit worktree listinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or warnings to the agent to disregard instructions potentially embedded within these external strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform sensitive operations likepaseo workspace renameandgit worktree removebased on retrieved data. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to external strings before they are used in commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
Bashtool to execute a wide range of commands includinggit,gh, andpaseo. While these are within the primary scope of managing worktrees, they provide a powerful interface that could be exploited if the agent context is compromised through indirect injection.
Audit Metadata