building-register-search
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill requires executing an external NPM package at runtime via
npx -y @nomadamas/k-skill@0. This pattern downloads and executes code from a non-whitelisted source, creating a significant security risk if the package is compromised. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to
k-skill-proxy.nomadamas.orgfor geocoding andapis.data.go.krfor building data. These external communications involve sending user-derived queries to third-party services. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions provided in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to execute several shell commands, includingnpxfor fetching instructions and updating the toolset, which bypasses static instruction analysis. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external APIs without using explicit boundary markers or instruction-ignoring warnings. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the upstream data source returns malicious content.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/building_register.pyfetches data usingurllib.requestfrom the vendor proxy and government API. - Boundary markers: Absent in the formatted output displayed to the agent.
- Capability inventory: Performs network GET requests, reads local configuration files (
~/.config/k-skill/secrets.env), and prints to stdout. No file-writing or subprocess-spawning logic was identified in the Python scripts. - Sanitization: Implements JSON and XML parsing for transport but does not sanitize the text content for LLM safety.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata