daangn-cars-search
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute
npx -y @nomadamas/k-skill@0 instruct daangn-cars-searchas a mandatory first step. This pattern downloads and runs a package from a public registry at runtime. Furthermore, it delegates the 'primary instructions' for the skill to the output of this command, effectively granting an external source control over the agent's instructional logic. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external sources for its operational logic and updates, directing the agent to fetch instructions from
github.com/NomaDamas/k-skilland use the@nomadamas/k-skillpackage for execution and maintenance. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external marketplace data.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/daangn_cars.pyscript fetches vehicle listings, titles, and car descriptions fromdaangn.comand outputs them to the agent context. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to treat the fetched car listing data as untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The agent environment allows shell command execution (Python, npx) and network access to retrieve data.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the marketplace content (e.g., stripping markdown or hidden instructions) before it is displayed to the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata