k-skill-cleaner
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to run
npx -y @nomadamas/k-skill@0, which downloads and executes a package from an untrusted source. This command is also used to fetch dynamic instructions via theinstructsubcommand, allowing for remote instruction injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches the
@nomadamas/k-skillpackage from the public npm registry. This source is not associated with any trusted organizations or well-known services provided in the analysis scope. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill and its included Python script (
scripts/k_skill_cleaner.py) are designed to read sensitive agent log files and transcripts located in paths such as~/.claude/transcripts/,~/.codex/sessions/, and~/.local/share/opencode/. These files contain private conversation history, user prompts, and code snippets. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from multiple agent transcript sources without evidence of sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: Transcripts and log files referenced in
instruction.mdand processed byscripts/k_skill_cleaner.py(e.g.,~/.claude/projects/**/*.jsonl). - Boundary markers: None identified; the instructions and script read raw log lines directly.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read the file system and execute shell commands via
npx. - Sanitization: Not present; the helper script uses regex patterns to search within raw transcript content, which could be influenced by malicious content inside the logs.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata