k-skill-cleaner

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to run npx -y @nomadamas/k-skill@0, which downloads and executes a package from an untrusted source. This command is also used to fetch dynamic instructions via the instruct subcommand, allowing for remote instruction injection.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches the @nomadamas/k-skill package from the public npm registry. This source is not associated with any trusted organizations or well-known services provided in the analysis scope.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill and its included Python script (scripts/k_skill_cleaner.py) are designed to read sensitive agent log files and transcripts located in paths such as ~/.claude/transcripts/, ~/.codex/sessions/, and ~/.local/share/opencode/. These files contain private conversation history, user prompts, and code snippets.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from multiple agent transcript sources without evidence of sanitization or boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: Transcripts and log files referenced in instruction.md and processed by scripts/k_skill_cleaner.py (e.g., ~/.claude/projects/**/*.jsonl).
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the instructions and script read raw log lines directly.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read the file system and execute shell commands via npx.
  • Sanitization: Not present; the helper script uses regex patterns to search within raw transcript content, which could be influenced by malicious content inside the logs.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 1, 2026, 02:41 PM