korean-scholarship-search
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary setup and workflow rely on an external package from an untrusted source. Instructions in
SKILL.mdandinstruction.mdmandate executingnpx -y @nomadamas/k-skill@0to fetch instructions and to run helper scripts. The-yflag bypasses package installation prompts, resulting in the silent download and execution of arbitrary remote code. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/test_scholarship_filter.pyutilizes dynamic module loading at runtime. Specifically, theload_modulefunction usesimportlib.util.spec_from_file_locationandspec.loader.exec_moduleto execute Python code from arbitrary file paths. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill involves shell command execution via subprocess calls. In
scripts/test_scholarship_filter.py, thesubprocess.runmethod is used to launch the Python interpreter and execute filtering scripts as separate processes. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a workflow for ingesting and processing data from external, untrusted web sources (scholarship announcements), which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Scholarship records are retrieved from external domains like
kosaf.go.krand various*.ac.kruniversity sites as described in the search workflow. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack boundary markers or specific guidance for the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the retrieved scholarship content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses command execution capabilities (via
npxandsubprocess) and file system access for processing JSON records. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the extracted scholarship text before it is presented in the final report to the agent/user.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata