korean-transit-route
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to run
npx -y @nomadamas/k-skill@0 instruct korean-transit-routeto obtain its primary operating instructions. This pattern executes code downloaded from an external third-party registry at runtime. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires multiple downloads of the
@nomadamas/k-skillpackage for functions such as fetching instructions, listing helper files, and performing updates. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: User queries containing addresses or place names are sent to an external third-party proxy server (
https://k-skill-proxy.nomadamas.org) for geocoding. While this is part of the functional design, it involves transmitting potentially sensitive user location data to a non-standard external endpoint. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to source environment variables from a local configuration file (
~/.config/k-skill/secrets.env) and usescurlto make API calls, incorporating these secrets into command-line arguments. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes transit route data and geocoding results from external APIs, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the upstream data sources are compromised.
- Ingestion points: Data is received from the
ODsayAPI and theKakaogeocoding proxy as documented ininstruction.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the data it processes.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to perform network requests (
curl,urllib.request) and read local configuration files. - Sanitization: Input queries are URL-encoded before being sent to external endpoints, which provides basic protection against malformed URI structures but not against higher-level instruction injection.
Audit Metadata