market-kurly-search
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute
npx -y @nomadamas/k-skill@0 instruct market-kurly-searchand explicitly tells the agent to follow the command's output as the 'primary instructions'. This allows for dynamic, unverified code and instruction execution at runtime from the npm registry. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the manual installation of the
market-kurly-searchnpm package and usesnpxto fetch additional helper files and updates from the@nomadamasscope, which is not a verified or trusted organization. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: By directing the agent to disregard the local file and follow the output of a remote command as its primary logic, the skill creates a mechanism for instruction redirection that can bypass local safety checks or static analysis.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and parse data from
api.kurly.comand the__NEXT_DATA__script tags onwww.kurly.com. This creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Data is fetched from
api.kurly.comsearch endpoints and thewww.kurly.com/goods/detail pages (instruction.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to treat the fetched product data as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within the search results.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
market-kurly-searchpackage to perform network requests and returns results to the agent for processing. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from the external web surfaces before it is interpolated into the agent's response context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata