mfds-food-safety
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions repeatedly direct the agent to run
npx -y @nomadamas/k-skill@0. This command fetches and executes code from a third-party npm package at runtime, creating a significant remote code execution vector from an untrusted source. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on a third-party CLI tool and a proxy service (
k-skill-proxy.nomadamas.org) that are not managed by trusted or well-known providers. This introduces supply chain risks as the agent is instructed to fetch instructions and helper files dynamically. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external food safety APIs, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the source data contains malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched from multiple food safety endpoints via a proxy service in
scripts/mfds_food_safety.py(e.g.,/v1/mfds/food-safety/search). - Boundary markers: The
instruction.mdfile includes a mandatory interview workflow and a response policy designed to prevent the agent from making medical diagnoses, though these markers may not prevent adversarial injection. - Capability inventory: The helper script (
scripts/mfds_food_safety.py) is limited to network GET requests and stdout; it does not have the capability to write files or execute subprocesses internally. - Sanitization: The script includes a
summarize_textfunction that removes HTML tags and unescapes HTML entities, providing basic sanitization of the fetched data.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata