naming-house
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill mandates the execution of code from an external, untrusted source via
npx -y @nomadamas/k-skill@0. The-yflag explicitly bypasses the standard confirmation prompt, resulting in immediate execution of arbitrary code from the network upon the agent's first step. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of an unverifiable third-party npm package
naming-houseand fetches additional instructions and files from theNomaDamasGitHub repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves shell commands for global package installation (
npm install -g), environment variable modification (export NODE_PATH), and piping scripts directly into the Node.js runtime. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates JavaScript code at runtime and executes it via the shell using heredocs (`node
- <<'JS'`). This pattern creates a vector for executing dynamically constructed logic outside of pre-defined scripts.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user data—such as birth details, city of birth, and candidate name strings—which are interpolated into shell commands and Node.js scripts. There is a lack of explicit sanitization or boundary markers to prevent malicious input from altering the intended execution logic of the
naming-housetool calls.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata