naver-blog-research
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions frequently utilize
npx -y @nomadamas/k-skill@0to fetch instructions, update the skill, and read references. This involves downloading and running code from an NPM package owned by an organization ('nomadamas') that is not recognized as a trusted vendor. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By using the
@nomadamas/k-skillCLI to execute the skill's Python scripts (e.g.,npx ... exec ... scripts/naver_search.py), the skill delegates execution control to an external package, which could be updated to include malicious behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python scripts (
naver_search.py,naver_read.py,naver_download_images.py) implement an--insecurecommand-line flag. When used, this flag disables SSL/TLS certificate verification via thessl.CERT_NONEsetting inscripts/_naver_http.py. Although limited to Naver-owned domains and accompanied by a warning, this practice facilitates man-in-the-middle attacks where an attacker could intercept or modify traffic. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external, attacker-controllable sources (Naver blog posts).
- Ingestion points: Content is retrieved from the web in
scripts/naver_read.pyandscripts/naver_search.py. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or specific instructions provided to the agent to treat the fetched content as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files to the disk and perform network requests.
- Sanitization: The extraction process cleans HTML tags but does not sanitize the text for natural language instructions that could trigger unintended agent actions.
Audit Metadata