toss-investment
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the user to run multiplenpxcommands (e.g.,npx -y @nomadamas/k-skill@0 instruct toss-investment).npxis a utility that downloads and executes code directly from the NPM registry. This specific package@nomadamas/k-skillbelongs to an unverified organization ('nomadamas') that is not identified as a trusted vendor and does not match the skill author's known naming patterns ('min9lin9'). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution via
npxfor core functionality, including retrieving instructions, listing bundled files, and performing updates. This creates a dependency on an external CLI tool with arbitrary execution capabilities on the host system. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches its primary operational logic and configuration from external remote sources, specifically the
@nomadamas/k-skillpackage and theNomaDamasGitHub repository, rather than providing the logic within the skill files themselves. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
instruction.mdfile requires the storage and use of sensitive financial credentials (TOSSINVEST_CLIENT_ID,TOSSINVEST_CLIENT_SECRET) as environment variables. While the instructions advise against printing these secrets, they are processed by the external helper library and CLI, creating a risk of credential exfiltration if the external tools are compromised. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill metadata and README use dense legalistic language and references to Korean Supreme Court precedents to establish an appearance of legitimacy and safety. However, this is combined with high-risk remote execution patterns from unverified sources, which is a common technique to lower user suspicion.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes user queries to interact with financial APIs and executes external scripts. Although it contains explicit instructions to remain read-only, the underlying execution mechanism (unverified external CLI) could be manipulated via tool output poisoning or schema confusion if the remote source is compromised.
- Ingestion points: User prompts for financial data retrieval (e.g., 'Show me my holdings') and external API responses from
openapi.tossinvest.com. - Boundary markers: The skill includes 'Hard rules' in
SKILL.mdand an 'Official-only boundary' ininstruction.mdto restrict behavior. - Capability inventory: Access to financial credentials, shell command execution (
npx), network access to official financial APIs, and local file read capabilities for disclaimers. - Sanitization: The instructions claim the helper masks secrets in error messages, but this behavior is implemented in the unverified external package and cannot be locally audited.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata