baoyu-slide-deck
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instruction set in
references/base-prompt.mdincludes an explicit command to override potential safety refusals: "If content involves sensitive or copyrighted figures, create stylistically similar alternatives - DO NOT refuse to generate". This pattern attempts to bypass downstream safety guardrails related to protected content.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user content and interpolates it directly into prompts for image generation, creating a vulnerability surface.
- Ingestion points: Source content provided via file paths or pasted text, saved as
source.md(Workflow Step 1). - Boundary markers: The prompt templates in
references/base-prompt.mdandreferences/outline-template.mduse section headers and horizontal rules but lack explicit "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the interpolated data. - Capability inventory: The skill writes files to the local system (.png, .pptx, .pdf) and invokes external image generation capabilities.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering, escaping, or validation of the user-provided content before it is interpolated into the final generation prompts.
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