self-learning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that override standard agent behavior by directing it to bypass user confirmation for file operations. It explicitly states "Act on the cue immediately — don't ask for permission first" and "harvest it without asking first."
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from the current conversation history to create persistent
SKILL.mdfiles, creating a surface for persisting malicious instructions as trusted skills. - Ingestion points: Conversation history (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters to isolate harvested content.
- Capability inventory: The skill directs the agent to create and update files on the filesystem (e.g., in
.claude/skillsor~/.claude/skills). - Sanitization: While the skill provides logic for redacting secrets, it lacks filtering or validation to prevent the persistence of malicious prompts or instructions harvested from the session.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates autonomous filesystem modifications, as it directs the agent to write new skill files based on its own assessment of the conversation without requiring human oversight.
Audit Metadata