self-learning

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that override standard agent behavior by directing it to bypass user confirmation for file operations. It explicitly states "Act on the cue immediately — don't ask for permission first" and "harvest it without asking first."
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from the current conversation history to create persistent SKILL.md files, creating a surface for persisting malicious instructions as trusted skills.
  • Ingestion points: Conversation history (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters to isolate harvested content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill directs the agent to create and update files on the filesystem (e.g., in .claude/skills or ~/.claude/skills).
  • Sanitization: While the skill provides logic for redacting secrets, it lacks filtering or validation to prevent the persistence of malicious prompts or instructions harvested from the session.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates autonomous filesystem modifications, as it directs the agent to write new skill files based on its own assessment of the conversation without requiring human oversight.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 2, 2026, 05:05 AM