marketing-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external websites (Google News, LinkedIn, Connectively) using the
agent-browsertool without explicit sanitization or boundary markers to isolate potential malicious instructions. - Ingestion points: Scrapes content from various search engines and professional networks via
agent-browseras specified in the Research Mode section ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or system instructions are provided to the agent to disregard instructions found within the scraped content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to write files to the local directory structure (
./brands/) and navigate the web. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external content is performed before it is added to the agent's context.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches the
agent-browserdependency from Vercel Labs' official GitHub repository during the setup process, which is a trusted source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Provides instructions to execute
agent-browser,npm, andnpxcommands for research tasks and tool installation (seeSKILL.mdandreferences/shared-patterns.md).
Audit Metadata