router
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from local project files to determine engine detection and task classification, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to scan various project files including
project.godot,*.uproject,package.json,Cargo.toml,conf.lua, and*.rbxl(x)to identify the engine and version.\n - Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to treat the content of these files as untrusted or to ignore any embedded natural language instructions within them.\n
- Capability inventory: While the router skill itself is limited to classification, it dispatches the agent to other specialized skills which likely possess broader file system, network, or execution capabilities.\n
- Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization or validation logic for the content read from these project metadata files.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use system-level CLI tools for environment detection and publishing workflows.\n
- Evidence: The agent is guided to run
godot --versionfor version detection inreferences/engine-detection.mdand usebutler pushfor publishing tasks inreferences/routing-table.md.
Audit Metadata