30-design-master-global
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it programmatically ingests data from various project-level files to construct prompts for image generation models. If an attacker modifies these source files, they could influence the generated output or the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads from
brand-guideline.md,prd.md,02-campaign-brief-global/output.md,package.json, andREADME.md(as documented inreferences/brand-identity-source.md). - Boundary markers: The skill does not use explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute Bash commands, write files to
docs/design/, and make network requests to the OpenAI API. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of the ingested project data is implemented before it is interpolated into prompts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill connects to the OpenAI API at
https://api.openai.com/v1/images/generationsto perform its primary function of generating design assets. This is a well-known and expected service for this utility. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Bash script logic to check for the presence of environment variables like
OPENAI_API_KEYand platform-specific executables like$OD_BINto determine available features and API tiers during execution.
Audit Metadata