doc-reader
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to download and install new agent logic from arbitrary remote locations using the
npx skills addcommand. This pattern is suggested whenever askill.mdfile is encountered on a documentation site, allowing unverified external code to be integrated into the agent's operating context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell-based tools including
curlandgrepto fetch and search documentation. These tools are used on data obtained from untrusted external URLs, which could lead to command argument manipulation if the remote site serves malicious content. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill frequently fetches content from external documentation sites to function. While this is the primary purpose, these downloads originate from untrusted sources provided at runtime.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests large amounts of potentially attacker-controlled content from documentation sites without sufficient safeguards.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches content from
llms.txt,llms-full.txt, and markdown URL variants from external doc sites as described in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters mentioned to isolate the external content or warn the agent against embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution via
curl,grep, and thenpxpackage manager to add new skills. - Sanitization: No validation, escaping, or sanitization processes are described for the data retrieved from external sources before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata