pr402-buyer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables agents to discover and pay for resources from arbitrary external service providers ("sellers"). This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection, as the agent is instructed to parse and act upon
PaymentRequiredobjects received from untrusted external URLs. A malicious seller could include instructions within these JSON objects to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The agent ingests untrusted data from the
PAYMENT-REQUIREDheaders and the body of HTTP 402 responses when requesting external resources (documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/exact-payment-flow.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify boundary markers or explicit warnings for the agent to ignore any natural language instructions that might be embedded within the structured payment data.
- Capability inventory: The skill grants the agent the ability to execute shell commands via
npxandnpm, and provides access to sensitive local files (wallet keypairs) defined in environment variables (documented inreferences/mcp-and-sdk.md). - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of the external payment requirements is described in the prompt logic, relying instead on the protocol's normalization rules.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to use command-line tools such as
npx,npm,pr402-buy, andforge-clito build and sign transactions. These are functional requirements for the skill's operation but represent significant capabilities. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration and documentation facilitate the download of several external dependencies and communication with remote facilitator services. These resources, including the
ipay.shfacilitator and packages under the@pr402and@http402namespaces, are consistent with the vendor's documented infrastructure.
Audit Metadata