24fps-motion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches a JavaScript engine from
https://24fps.dev/editor/engine.jsand various presets in JSON format fromhttps://24fps.dev/video-editor/. These resources are intended to be saved and executed within the local development environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a remote MCP (Model Context Protocol) server at
https://24fps.dev/mcp. This server provides the tool definitions and logic that the agent executes, effectively delegating tool behavior to a remote endpoint. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation instructs the agent and user to perform several shell operations using the
npx hyperframesCLI. These commands include media analysis (beats), transcription (transcribe), background removal (remove-background), and rendering (render). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The tools
get_clipandget_editor_assetretrieve external prompts and preset data from the remote24fps.devdomain (e.g., clip slugs and preset IDs). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to treat this fetched content as untrusted data or to ignore potential instructions embedded within the retrieved prompts.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted capabilities to write local files (project source code), execute shell commands via
npx, and perform network operations. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization steps for the data fetched from the remote library before it is used to generate or adapt code.
Audit Metadata