eval
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted inputs generated by other agents, creating an exposure to indirect prompt injection where malicious content in an agent's output could attempt to influence the LLM judge's ranking or justification.
- Ingestion points: Reads the output of
git diffand agent result posts from.agenthub/board/results/agent-{i}-result.mdas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions or delimiters specified to partition untrusted agent data from the judge instructions.
- Capability inventory: Executes local Python scripts (
result_ranker.pyandsession_manager.py) to manage sessions and handle ranking. - Sanitization: Absent; no validation or filtering of the agent-generated text or diffs is mentioned before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes local command-line operations to execute its ranking logic and update session state. It also accommodates a configurable evaluation command (
--eval-cmd "{eval_cmd}") designed to execute within each agent's worktree to obtain metric data.
Audit Metadata