t2000-connect
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends the installation of the
@t2000/clipackage from the NPM registry, which is a third-party dependency not belonging to a known trusted organization.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill configures the agent to use a remote MCP server athttps://mcp.t2000.ai/mcp. This allows the agent's tools and behaviors to be defined and updated by an external service provider.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions include shell commands likenpm i -g @t2000/cliandnpx @t2000/cli mcp uninstallfor software installation and maintenance, which involves executing code on the user's system.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to retrieve and process user-generated job descriptions from an external job board, creating a surface for indirect instructions.\n - Ingestion points: The
t2000_job_statustool fetches theworkOrderfield, which contains untrusted content from the t2000 service.\n - Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to distinguish between data and potential commands within the
workOrder.\n - Capability inventory: The agent has access to financial tools such as
t2000_job_settle,pay x402, andsend. A maliciousworkOrdercould attempt to manipulate the agent into misusing these capabilities.\n - Sanitization: There is no mention of content filtering or validation for the job data retrieved from the server.
Audit Metadata