t2000-save
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
@t2000/clipackage from the NPM registry. This package is an external dependency from a source not identified as a well-known service in the context of this analysis.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instruction to runnpx @t2000/cli initdirectly downloads and executes code from a remote source at runtime, which is a significant execution vector.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality relies on executing shell commands, specificallyt2000 save <amount>, which runs on the host system.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it interpolates the<amount>variable directly into a shell command without sanitization or boundary markers.\n - Ingestion points: The
<amount>parameter in thet2000 savecommand is sourced from user instructions.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The prompt does not provide delimiters to isolate the input value from the executable command.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
t2000CLI tool, which has the capability to interact with the network and file system to process transactions on the Sui network.\n - Sanitization: Absent. There is no logic to validate that the
<amount>input is a numeric scalar, allowing for the possibility of shell metacharacter injection.
Audit Metadata