tarot-guide

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions in SKILL.md direct the agent to interpolate raw, unsanitized user input directly into a shell command string (e.g., python ... --picks "<用户原始输入>"). This creates a command injection surface where a user could provide input containing shell metacharacters like double quotes followed by command separators (e.g., "; rm -rf /; ") to execute arbitrary commands.\n
  • Ingestion points: User-provided numbers or text strings for card selection are captured in the third interaction round and passed as the picks argument.\n
  • Boundary markers: The command template uses double quotes, which can be escaped or terminated by malicious input.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes a local Python script (draw_cards.py) and reads local reference markdown files.\n
  • Sanitization: While the backend script draw_cards.py uses regular expressions to safely extract numbers, the skill's instruction for command construction lacks any sanitization or escaping instructions for the agent to prevent shell breakout.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches tarot card images from Wikimedia Commons (commons.wikimedia.org). This is a well-known service used to provide visual aids for the tarot reading and is documented here as part of the intended functionality.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 09:05 AM