skill-selector
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download and installation of remote agent skills from GitHub repositories. The catalog in
references/catalog.mdpoints to repositories under the author's namespace (mizchi) and other well-known technology organizations such asmoonbitlangandast-grep. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructs the agent to execute the
apmcommand-line tool (e.g.,apm install,apm view) to manage project and global skills. This is the primary function of the skill and is triggered based on project analysis. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Contains an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) as it reads untrusted external data from project files (e.g.,
package.json,moon.mod.json,flake.nix) to drive logic for skill proposals. - Ingestion points: Signal detection logic in
SKILL.mdreads project manifests likepackage.json,moon.mod.json,gleam.toml,flake.nix, and.github/workflows/. - Boundary markers: Absent; instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when reading these manifest files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute
apm install,apm view, and perform file-write operations toapm.ymlandapm.lock.yamlas documented inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill relies on simple key/signal detection without explicit validation of the content within the manifest files.
Audit Metadata