import-claude-skills
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and 'inspect' third-party repositories containing instruction files (SKILL.md). This creates a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection, where instructions within a source repository could attempt to override agent behavior or exfiltrate data during the porting process.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/list_claude_skills.pyscript identifies external skill files, which the agent is then instructed to read and inspect. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety instructions are provided to the agent to treat external SKILL.md content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file read/write capabilities via the provided Python scripts.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content read from external repositories.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of two local Python scripts (
scripts/list_claude_skills.pyandscripts/import_skill.py). Theimport_skill.pyscript performs high-risk file system operations, includingshutil.rmtree(recursive directory deletion) when the--forceflag is used, andshutil.copytree. While functional for porting skills, these capabilities could be misused if the agent is directed toward sensitive system paths. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Multiple files, including
SKILL.mdandscripts/import_skill.py, contain hardcoded absolute paths (e.g.,C:\Users\nd851\.codex\skills). This constitutes information disclosure by revealing a specific local username ('nd851') associated with the environment for which the skill was developed.
Audit Metadata