architect
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is configured to connect to an external Model Context Protocol (MCP) endpoint at
https://cyeam-wiki-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp. This server defines the tools and prompts that the agent will use. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a dynamic instruction loading mechanism where it fetches a 'system prompt' (
wiki_query_system) from the remote MCP server. This design allows the external server to dictate the agent's persona and safety guidelines at runtime, bypassing the local skill file's configuration. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes instructions for using a
curltool to perform real-time network requests. It specifically directs the agent to generate and access URLs, providing a general-purpose network communication capability. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface through its wiki retrieval tools.
- Ingestion points: Content retrieved from
wiki_query,wiki_search_index, andwiki_get_article(file: SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified; external content is integrated directly into the agent's context without clear delimiters.
- Capability inventory: Network operations (
curl), dynamic system prompt loading (wiki_query_system). - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization procedures are mentioned for processing external data.
Audit Metadata