skills/mnhkahn/cyeam-cli/git-cmsg/Gen Agent Trust Hub

git-cmsg

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Automatically executes git add . to stage all modified and untracked files when the skill is triggered. While the skill includes logic to intelligently judge file safety and unstage known bad patterns (like .env or id_rsa), the initial aggressive staging of all files without prior review increases the surface area for accidental commitment of sensitive data if the filtering logic fails or is incomplete.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill attempts to collect metadata about the agent's environment by reading the configuration file ~/.trae/traecli.yaml and checking environment variables like $ANTHROPIC_MODEL and $ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL. This data is formatted into a Co-authored-by trailer and included in the final commit message. If the user proceeds with the git push option, this internal environment metadata is exfiltrated to the remote Git server.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted code content from the repository through git diff --cached (referenced in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the code changes being analyzed.
  • Capability inventory: Uses Bash for shell execution and AskUserQuestion for user interaction.
  • Sanitization: There is no documented process for sanitizing or escaping the content retrieved from code diffs before passing it to the LLM for analysis and message generation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 30, 2026, 03:07 AM