moda-deck
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from the web and local file systems to generate presentation slides, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
moda web searchandmoda web readcommands, as well as via local file-reading and search tools used during the gathering phase. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly provide boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded directives within the ingested data, although it emphasizes verbatim data preservation.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute numerous
modaCLI commands (authorized viaBash(moda:*)) to create and modify canvas content, generate AI media, and export files. - Sanitization: The skill relies on a markup parser that strips disallowed HTML tags and a sandboxed JavaScript environment (
moda canvas edit) that blocks sensitive operations likefetch,eval, andrequire. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads brand assets from temporary signed URLs for visual inspection as part of the brand verification workflow.
- Evidence:
references/brand.mdcontains instructions to download files usingcurl -o /tmp/brand-logo-1.png "<url>". - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured to execute commands exclusively through the
modatoolset. - Evidence: The
SKILL.mdfile definesallowed-toolsasBash(moda:*). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a sandboxed JavaScript environment to perform batch mutations and logic-heavy edits on the presentation canvas.
- Evidence:
references/edit-code.mddescribes themoda canvas editcommand which runs synchronous JavaScript to update nodes, pages, and variables.
Audit Metadata