moda-video-motion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from existing canvases and brand kits which could contain malicious instructions.\n
- Ingestion points: The agent reads data via
moda canvas read(inreferences/reading-and-verifying.md) andmoda brand show(inreferences/brand.md).\n - Boundary markers: The documentation includes explicit instructions to treat canvas content as data rather than instructions and defines an
agent_instructionsmetadata field as context only.\n - Capability inventory: The agent can execute commands via
Bash(moda:*), run sandboxed JavaScript withmoda canvas edit, and modify the canvas withmoda canvas markup.\n - Sanitization: JavaScript execution is restricted to a sandbox that blocks sensitive APIs (e.g.,
eval,require,fetch), and markup parsing follows a strict XML grammar.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a sandboxed JavaScript environment for manipulating canvas nodes and animations at runtime.\n - Evidence: The
moda canvas editcommand (detailed inreferences/edit-code.md) and the<generate>markup tag (inreferences/markup.md) execute agent-generated code. The sandbox provides aMathfacade while blocking access to global objects likeprocess,document, andconsoleto prevent breakout.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a specialized command-line interface (moda) for all operations, including media generation and file management.\n - Evidence: The
Bash(moda:*)tool is used to perform subcommands such ascanvas markup,media generate-video, andfile upload. These interactions are restricted to the vendor's CLI namespace but allow broad manipulation of the platform's assets.
Audit Metadata