deep-interview
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill captures untrusted user input and interpolates it into prompts for the 'Explore' and 'interviewer' subagents.
- Ingestion points: Stage 1.1 extracts the core problem from user input, and Stage 2.2 captures the user's answers to interview questions.
- Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple quotes) or provide 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when passing user data to subagents.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Write,Agent,Read,Grep, andGlobtools, creating a functional surface if a subagent is successfully manipulated by user input. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering for strings provided by the user before they are processed by the subagent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Writetool to save insights to a file path constructed from a user-supplied topic. - Evidence: In Stage 3.3, the skill performs a
Write("deep-interview-outputs/[topic-slug]/insights.md", insights_content)operation. Thetopic-slugis derived from the user's initial input. Without proper sanitization of this slug, there is a theoretical risk of path traversal if the underlying platform'sWritetool does not enforce strict directory boundaries.
Audit Metadata