doc-drift

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive user-global directories and files to perform its audit.
  • Evidence: It explicitly targets ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md, ~/.claude/projects/<encoded-cwd>/memory/MEMORY.md, and ~/.claude/plugins/** to collect memory and configuration data.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from project documents which could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Reads CLAUDE.md, MEMORY.md, and recursively follows @import tokens and markdown links ([text](./path.md)) within the project and user-global directories.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings to the model to ignore instructions embedded within the files being audited.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the .drift-reports/ directory, create new git branches, and execute CLI commands to create Pull Requests.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from the audited files before it is processed by the LLM.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes external CLI tools to perform its automated fix functions.
  • Evidence: It executes gh pr create to generate Pull Requests for document improvements.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 11:34 AM