doc-drift
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive user-global directories and files to perform its audit.
- Evidence: It explicitly targets
~/.claude/CLAUDE.md,~/.claude/projects/<encoded-cwd>/memory/MEMORY.md, and~/.claude/plugins/**to collect memory and configuration data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from project documents which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Reads
CLAUDE.md,MEMORY.md, and recursively follows@importtokens and markdown links ([text](./path.md)) within the project and user-global directories. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings to the model to ignore instructions embedded within the files being audited.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the
.drift-reports/directory, create new git branches, and execute CLI commands to create Pull Requests. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from the audited files before it is processed by the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes external CLI tools to perform its automated fix functions.
- Evidence: It executes
gh pr createto generate Pull Requests for document improvements.
Audit Metadata